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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
KENDALL Q. NORTHERN, 
Plaintiff & Appellant, 
vs. 
N. ELDON BARNES, WARDEN, 
UTAH STATE PRISON AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
THROUGH THE BOARD OF PARDONS, 
Defendants & Appellees. 
Case No. 900566-CA 
Oral Argument 
Priority No. 3 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appellant Kendall Q. Northern (hereinafter "Northern"), by and 
through his counsel Haley & Stolebarger, hereby submits this Reply 
Brief in support of his appeal from the Order of Dismissal entered 
by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson of the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County. 
ARGUMENT 
A. NORTHERN'S PAROLE DOES NOT RENDER MOOT THE ISSUES BEFORE 
THE COURT. 
The State argues that since Northern was paroled on July 9, 
1991, Northern has received his requested relief and this appeal is 
now moot. This is simply not the case. By his appeal, Northern 
sought not only his immediate release on parole, but also an order 
that gives him credit toward his term of parole for all periods of 
his incarceration since May 10, 1988, and such other relief as the 
Court may determine to be appropriate. 
As a result of the rescission of his May 10, 1988, parole 
date, and his continued imprisonment, Northern was forced to 
suffer further deprivation of some of his most basic rights for 
another two years. Northern was not able to travel, associate with 
family and friends, or enjoy numerous other basic freedoms that 
would have come with parole, even with its restrictions. If the 
Court finds that the trial court erred in finding that the Board of 
Pardon's rescission of Northern's May 10, 1988, parole date was 
legal and proper, then Northern is surely entitled to some 
compensation for the losses he suffered while being improperly 
detained and deprived of his rights. While the Court cannot give 
back to Northern the years taken or truly compensate him for the 
deprivation he endured during those years, it can shorten the 
period of his parole, ordering that the terms of the May 10, 1988, 
parole be reinstated nunc pro tunc as of May 10, 1988. Clearly, a 
controversy still exists and Northern has the requisite standing to 
continue to seek redress in this Court. 
Also, in November 1990 the Board of Pardons gave Northern a 
new parole date of July 9, 1991; yet it did not notify him until 
July 2, 1991, that restitution would be a condition of his parole. 
Restitution had not been ordered by the Board in 1981 at his 
initial hearing, in 1984 at his Reconsideration, or in 1988 at his 
April Special Attention hearing. Northern was then given the 
opportunity to contest the restitution at a hearing scheduled for 
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July 15, 1991, six days after his scheduled parole date — or he 
could choose to waive his right to a hearing. In light of the 
events of May 1988, Northern made the only intelligent choice. A 
true and correct copy of the Waiver of Personal Appearance is 
attached as Addendum A. Addendum B is the Board's explanation of 
its order, which is replete with arbitrariness, speculation and 
illogic; ironically, some of the same qualities that infected the 
Board's 1988 decision to rescind Northern's parole. 
Finally, this is an issue which affects the interests of all 
inmates who are or will become eligible for parole, is likely to 
recur in a similar manner to other inmates and yet because of the 
extended time periods involved in the habeas and appellate process, 
is prone to escaping judicial review. As such the Court should 
hear the case without regard to issues of mootness. Wickham v. 
Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981); Kehl v. Schwendiman. 735 
P.2d 413, 415 (Utah App. 1987). 
In Wickham, a pretrial detainee at the Weber County jail filed 
a habeas corpus petition attacking the conditions of confinement at 
the jail. The trial court granted partial relief in response to 
the petition. Unsatisfied with only partial relief, the petitioner 
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. During the pendency of the 
appeal, the petitioner moved beyond the pretrial stage. The 
defendants then sought to have the appeal dismissed as moot since 
the petitioner was no longer a pretrial detainee. The Supreme 
Court found that petitioner did have standing, stating that: 
fl[t]he law provides no exemption from judicial scrutiny 
of unlawful acts which are likely to be repeated because 
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they do not fall within the usual principles of standing 
and justiciability. 
The fact that present and future detainees will suffer 
conditions at the jail for a period of time insufficient 
for a case to receive appellate review during the 
imposition of such conditions reflects a continuing and 
recurring controversy sufficient to invoke the 
jurisdiction of this Court." 
Id. at 899-900. 
The actions of the Board of Pardons should not escape judicial 
scrutiny merely because the Board of Pardons has now seen fit to 
parole Northern. As evidenced by the Utah Supreme Court's opinion 
in Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 
1991), issues concerning the role of due process in Board of 
Pardons decisions are certainly issues which "affect the public 
interest." Further, the Board of Pardons' failure to provide the 
requisite due process continues to occur. As evidence of this 
continued failure the Court need look no further than the Board of 
Pardons' handling of Northern's July 9, 1991 parole. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE BOARD'S 
DECISION WAS REASONABLE. 
The State asserts that "[t]he issue before this Court is 
whether the trial court was correct in concluding that the record 
supported the Board of Pardons' decision to rescind petitioner's 
prospective parole release date." Brief of Appellees, p. 10. 
Based on this statement, the State devotes a considerable portion 
of its brief arguing the correctness of the Board of Pardons' 
decision. However, the correctness of the decision of the Board of 
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Pardons is not directly at issue in this case. What is at issue is 
whether the trial court correctly concluded that the Board of 
Pardons acted properly and within the constitutional limitations 
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Foote.1 
Recognizing that the actions of the Board of Pardons were 
subject to some limitations, the trial court concluded that "once 
a parole date has been granted, it cannot be taken away by the 
Board of Pardons inappropriately or unreasonably or upon the whim 
of the Board members." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order of Dismissal p. 7 (attached to Appellant's Brief as Addendum 
C). The trial court then reviewed the Board of Pardons' action 
under a "reasonable basis" standard (a standard which appears to be 
less stringent than the due process standard required by Foote) and 
concluded that as a matter of law there was a "reasonable basis" 
for the actions. Id. As discussed more thoroughly in Northern's 
Brief of Appellant and throughout this Reply Brief, the trial 
court's legal conclusions are erroneous. 
Foote requires that the Board of Pardons have much more than 
a "reasonable basis" for their actions. The Board of Pardons must 
afford prospective parolees the same due process afforded by 
courts. Foote, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4. By rescinding Northern's 
parole date without any new evidence of his danger to the community 
and without proper notice to Northern and a hearing, the Board of 
1
 This issue presents a question of law and is therefore 
subject to a strict correctness review, giving no deference to the 
trial court's decision. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 
Blomguist. 773 P. 2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989); Brinkerhoff v. 
Schwendiman. 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah App. 1990). 
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Pardons violated not only its own rules, but also some of the most 
basis tenets of due process. However, even though this alone 
establishes that the trial court's Order of Dismissal was in error, 
the record in this case demonstrates that the Northern's parole 
date was rescinded not on a reasonable basis, but on the whim of 
the Board of Pardons. 
On July 8, 1988, two months after the rescission of Northern's 
parole date, the Board of Pardons held what was purported to be the 
"rescission hearing" required by Rule 3.10. During this hearing, 
Victoria Palacios, a member of the Board of Pardons, questioned 
Northern and made statements which evidence the real basis for the 
rescission of Northern's parole date: this Board's view that the 
1980 Board simply did not order Northern to serve enough years in 
prison for his crime. After expressing concern about Northern's 
possible dangerousness on the streets, Ms. Palacios stated "that to 
release you [Northern] after only eight years is to depreciate the 
value of his [the victim's] life and ignore the impact on the 
Hambys [the victim's family]." Transcript of July 8, 1988 hearing, 
p. 30 (attached to Appellees' Brief as Addendum D). In affirming 
the Board or Pardon's rescission, the unnamed "Chairperson" at the 
July 8 hearing also stated that the concerns expressed by Ms. 
Palacios were the basis for the rescission. Id. at p. 36. 
From this hearing, it is clear that the real reason for the 
rescission of Northern's May 1988 parole date was that the 1988 
Board of Pardons simply disagreed with the decision of the 1981 
Board of Pardons. Its Notice of Decision, attached hereto as 
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Addendum C, in which the reasons for recision are noted as 
"appropriate punishment" and "risk to society," based on the nature 
of his crime, confirm the basis of the Board's decision: its desire 
for additional retribution. The Board then sought to justify its 
actions by claiming reliance on evidence that was neither new nor 
that demonstrated that Northern was a risk to society as required 
by Rule 3.10. 
In his deposition, Paul Boyden, a Board member in 1988, 
described the impact of letters it had received regarding the 
victim and his family (Deposition of Paul Boyden, p. 37), new Board 
sentencing guidelines that set longer sentences for this kind of 
offense (Deposition of Paul Boyden, p. 87-88), and the power of the 
1988 Board to set aside "improvident" action by the 1981 Board 
(Deposition of Paul Boyden, p. 75). This testimony, guarded though 
it was, confirms the real basis for the Board's action. Such 
whimsical, arbitrary decision are intolerable, have no reasonable 
basis and cannot pass the muster of due process as required by 
Foote. 
C. NORTHERN HAD A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 
AT THE TIME THE BOARD OF PARDONS DETERMINED THE ACTUAL 
NUMBER OF YEARS HE WAS TO BE IMPRISONED. 
The State next contends that Northern has "no substantial 
constitutional right to be released on parole prior to the 
expiration of his sentence." Brief of Appellees, p. 13. Such a 
statement again demonstrates that the State misapprehends both the 
issues of this case and the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in 
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Foote. Simply put, this case is about the trial court's error in 
failing to recognize the illegality of the Board's conduct and its 
failure to afford Northern his constitutional right to due process. 
In attempting to support its position, the State relies on the 
case of Kelly v. Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board, 637 P. 2d 858 
(Okl.Cr. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 923 (1982). A review of 
Kelly shows such reliance to be disingenuous at best. The facts of 
the case suggest that under the sentencing scheme employed in Kelly 
the trial court imposed any prison sentence. After a certain 
fraction of that sentence had been served, a prisoner could, but 
was not required to, be considered for parole. Id. Thus, the 
"parole docket date" which respondents attempt to equate to the 
parole date given Northern is merely a date on which a prisoner 
could be considered for parole and not an actual parole date. Id. 
As such, the reasoning of the Oklahoma court is of no consequence 
to the instant case. 
What does have significance in this case is the reasoning of 
the Utah Supreme Court which has expressly stated that in giving a 
prisoner a parole date, thereby determining the length of the 
prisoner's sentence, the Board of Pardons must afford the prisoner 
the same due process protections found in the courts. Foote, 156 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 4. Additionally, in giving Northern a parole 
date, the Board of Pardons created an expectation of parole, 
thereby creating a due process liberty interest in parole release. 
See, Board of Pardons v. Allen. 482 U.S. 369 (1987). By failing to 
follow its own procedural rules and by failing to give Northern 
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notice of the evidence relied on and reasons for the rescission of 
his May 1988 parole date along with an appropriate hearing, the 
Board of Pardons has failed to give Northern that to which he has 
a constitutional right — due process. 
D. NO "NEW EVIDENCE" EXISTED TO JUSTIFY RESCISSION OF 
NORTHERN'S PAROLE DATE. 
Board of Pardons7 Rule 3.10 states that a parole date may be 
rescinded if "new evidence is presented which shows that the 
prisoner, if released, would present a serious risk or danger to 
the community." The State contends, and the trial court agreed, 
that such new evidence existed to support the rescission of 
Northern's May 1988 parole date. 
Northern does not contend that there was absolutely no 
evidence to support the rescission of his parole date. Rather, 
Northern contends that there was no "new evidence" within Rule 3.10 
to support the Board of Pardons' actions. 
Given its plain and literal meaning2, the term "new evidence" 
must be defined as evidence which was previously unknown or of 
recent or fresh origin. See, Black's Law Dictionary 940 (5th ed. 
1979)(Defining "new"). Further support for this definition of "new 
evidence" is found in Ready v. United States Parole Commission, 483 
F.Supp. 1273 (M.D.Pa. 1980). 
In Ready, a federal prisoner filed a petition for writ of 
2
 A statute or regulation should generally be construed 
according to its plain and literal language. See e.g.. Brinkerhoff 
v. Forsyth. 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989). 
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habeas corpus alleging that the Parole Commission had improperly 
rescinded his parole. Under the federal parole scheme at the time, 
a parole could be rescinded only "upon receipt of new information 
adverse to the prisoner regarding matters other than institutional 
misconduct" Id^ _ at 1276 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 2.34(b)(1978)). The 
Parole Commission contended that letters received, after the 
granting of a parole date, from the U.S. Attorney's office and the 
Internal Revenue Service concerning the petitioner's involvement in 
a tax fraud scheme at the federal prison constituted new 
information. The court rejected this claim, stating that the 
Parole Commission was or should have been aware of allegations 
concerning petitioner's involvement in the tax fraud scheme at the 
time it made its original parole determination. Thus, the later 
letters on the same subject could not be considered "new 
information" within the meaning of the regulation. Id. at 1276-77. 
Rather, "new information" could only be read to include that 
information which the Parole Commission previously did not know or 
could not have known of. Id. at 1277. 
A review of the record in this case shows that the trial court 
found three pieces of evidence served as the basis for rescission 
of Northern's parole date. The first was that Northern had a drug 
problem and abused drugs during the first two years of his 
incarceration. The Board of Pardons learned of this evidence in 
the summer of 1984 yet reaffirmed Northern's May 1988 parole date 
in September 1984. 
The second piece of evidence used by the Board of Pardons' was 
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that Northern admitted in February 1988 to using marijuana on 
February 25, 1988. Again this evidence, submitted by the Duchesne 
Jail in writing to the prison, was known by the Board of Pardons 
prior to May 1988 but was not raised as a problem in the April 19, 
1988, hearing3. Instead, the Board of Pardons, through Paul 
Larsen, continued to work with Northern in an attempt to work out 
the details of Northern's parole supervision. 
The third piece of evidence was a psychological evaluation of 
Northern dated May 5, 1988. This evaluation specifically noted 
that the Board of Pardons was to consider the report a favorable 
one. See, Addendum C to Brief of Appellant. 
The term "new evidence" can only be read to encompass this 
third piece of evidence. Only this evidence was previously unknown 
to the Board of Pardons; all other evidence was known to the Board 
of Pardons but deliberately not acted upon. 
Additionally, although "new evidence", this report is not a 
sufficient basis for rescission under Rule 3.10. Rule 3.10 
required that the Board of Pardons have new evidence that Northern 
presented "a serious risk or danger to the community" before 
rescinding his parole date. A report which states that Northern 
has shown a great deal of growth and maturing, does not have the 
capacity for violent acting out, responds to authority when 
necessary and, most importantly, specifically states that it is to 
be regarded as a favorable one can hardly be considered evidence 
3
 A copy of the transcript of this hearing is included in the 
Appellees7 Brief as Addendum B. 
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that Northern presented such a serious risk or danger. Thus, the 
Board of Pardons had no basis under its own Rule 3.10 to rescind 
Northern's parole and its actions of May 9, 1988, only served to 
deprive Northern of his constitutional right to due process.4 
E. UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, THE BOARD OF PARDONS WAS 
REQUIRED TO GIVE NORTHERN NOTICE AND A HEARING BEFORE 
RESCINDING HIS MAY 1988 PAROLE DATE. 
On May 9, 1988, one day before he was to be paroled, the Board 
of Pardons rescinded Northern's parole date. This action was taken 
without any notice to Northern and without benefit of a rescission 
hearing, both of which were required by Rule 3.10. The State 
contends that Board of Pardons' actions fell within the exception 
to Rule 3.10. Again, given its plain and literal meaning, the 
language of Rule 3.10 does not support this contention. 
In May 1988, Rule 3.10-2 reads as follows: 
Prior to the rescinding of a parole or rehearing 
date, information shall be provided to the Board 
establishing the basis for the rescission hearing. Upon 
receipt of such information, the offender will be 
scheduled for a rescission hearing. Except under 
extraordinary circumstances, the offender will be 
notified of all allegation and the date of the scheduled 
hearing at least seven days in advance. 
The State argues that the Board of Pardon's failure to give 
notice and hold a hearing before rescinding Northern's parole date 
was justified under the extraordinary circumstance language of the 
4
 Fundamental notions of due process require that the Board of 
Pardons adhere to its own rules and any failure to do so is 
violative of constitutional due process protections. See, 
International House v. National Labor Relations Board, 676 F.2d 
906, 912 (2d Cir. 1982); Government of Canal Zone v. Brooks, 427 
F.2d 346, 347 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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third sentence. This position clearly misreads the Rule. The 
exceptional circumstance language only applies to the requirement 
that the prisoner be given seven days notice of the allegations 
against him and the hearing. It does not totally waive the notice 
and hearing requirements as the State would have this Court 
believe. Under any circumstances, Northern was entitled to some 
notice of the allegations against him and to a hearing before 
having his parole date rescinded. Northern has never been informed 
of the allegations against him5. Further, a hearing held some two 
months after rescission of the parole date can hardly be considered 
compliance with Rule 3.106. Thus, by completely ignoring its own 
procedural rules, the Board of Pardons has denied Northern his 
5
 A failure to give notice creates a great risk that erroneous 
information may serve as a basis for decisions made by the Board of 
Pardons. As Justice Marshall noted in his dissenting opinion in 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex 442 
U.S. 1 (1979), prison and parole files often contain errors. 
Justice Marshall cited the following as examples: Kohlman v. 
Norton, 380 F.Supp. 1073 (D.Conn. 1974)(parole denied because file 
erroneously indicated that applicant had used gun in committing 
robbery); Leonard v. Mississippi State Probation and Parole Board, 
373 F.Supp. 699 (N.D.Miss. 1974)(prisoner denied parole on basis of 
illegal disciplinary action); In re Rodriguez. 537 P. 2d 384 
(Cal.App. 1975)(factually incorrect material in file led parole 
officers to believe that prisoner had violent tendencies and that 
his family rejected him); State v. Pohlabel, 160 A. 2d 647 
(N.J.Super. 1960)(files erroneously showed that prisoner was under 
a life sentence in another jurisdiction); Hearings on H.R. 13118 et 
al. before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Judiciary Committee, 92d 
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. VII-A, p. 451 (1972)(testimony of Dr. Willard 
Gaylin: "I have seen black men listed as white and Harvard 
graduates listed with borderline IQ's"). Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 
33 n. 15. 
6
 Paul Boyden, a member of the Board of Pardons which 
rescinded Northern's parole date, expressly recognized that 
rescinding a parole date without a hearing and then later holding 
a hearing was improper. Deposition of Paul Boyden, p. 49. 
13 
liberty without the requisite due process of law.7 
F. THE BOARD OF PARDONS7 FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH EVEN THE 
MOST FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF DUE PROCESS SERVED TO 
SUBJECT NORTHERN TO CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 
The State suggests that the Board of Pardons7 actions in this 
case were well within the standards of decency accepted by our 
society and that the punishment inflicted on Northern was not cruel 
and unusual. In support of this position, the State asserts that 
"the Board of Pardons could rescind a scheduled parole or 
termination date at any time prior to an inmates [sic] release 
without infringing upon any constitutional right of an inmate." 
Brief of Appellees, p. 21. By this statement, the State has again 
demonstrated its ignorance of the Foote decision and its continuing 
belief that Board of Pardons is all powerful, answering to no one, 
accountable to no court. Punishment by such tyrants is one of the 
very evils that both the United States and Utah Constitutions seek 
to prevent. 
Punishments in our society are determined only after due 
process has been afforded. We no longer endorse the playing of 
cruel mind games on inmates, such as dangling a release date in 
front of a prisoner, only to take that date away at the last 
7
 Northern in no way concedes that any exceptional 
circumstances existed at the time his parole was rescinded. 
Northern had been incarcerated for nearly 8 years during which time 
the Board of Pardons could have requested a psychological 
evaluation. The Board of Pardons' failure to request such an 
evaluation until shortly before Northern's scheduled parole cannot 
be considered an exceptional circumstance as the term is used in 
Rule 3.10. 
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moment, solely on the whim of the Board of Pardons. This type of 
action shocks the moral conscience of our society and this Court 
must condemn and put an end to any such future actions by the Board 
of Pardons. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court is not asked to decide whether the Board of 
Pardons' decision concerning Northern was correct. Rather, the 
Court is asked to decide whether, based on the findings of fact and 
the record in the case below, the trial court was correct in 
concluding that the Board of Pardons afforded Northern the 
requisite due process in reaching its decision and acted on a 
lawful basis to rescind Northern's parole date. By violating its 
own policies and procedures and substituting its harsher judgment 
of Northern and his crime for that of an earlier Board, the Board 
of Pardons has exhibited complete disdain for even the most 
fundamental notions of due process and the Court cannot allow such 
actions to continue. Northern's recent parole does not render this 
action moot. Issues of great public concern remain before the 
Court and the Court may afford Northern relief beyond that which he 
has now been given. 
15 
DATED this 9th day of September, 1991. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
(u^y^t /pLAJ^^^^h^ 
Jo^Carol Nesset-Sale 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 9th 
day of September, 1991: 
R. Paul Van Dam 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Kirk M. Torgensen 
Assistant Attorney General 
6100 South 300 East, Suite 403 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
(~pc^^ J 
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ADDENDUM A 
Waiver of Personal Appearance 
Norman H. Bangtrtar 
Governor 
RL(Pata)Hiun 
Chairman 
Uambara 
Donald E Blanchard 
MlchaalR.SIbbatt 
Wttrtam L. Piurf 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WAIVER OF PERSONAL APPEARANCE 
-' ^ 
# -
I» KENDALL QUiNN NOKTHERN , USP# 
15009 
understand I have the right to appear before the Board of Pardons in regard to 
the addition of special conditions to my Parole Agreement. I hereby waive my 
personal appearance before the Utah State Board of Pardons end request that my 
Parole Agreement be amended to include the following condition(s): 
ii tiji I •' ' "~~ ' " " "" " - - • " • r niirr • i n u\ •nil ~ - i i • inr i~ ~ i _ -
PAY RESTITUTION IN THE AMOUNT OF $26,350-00 on CASE #CR80-264 
witness 
ADDENDUM B 
Letter from Paul Larsen to Jo Carol Nesset-Sale 
Dated July 25, 1991 
State of Utah 
BOARD OF PARDONS 
448 East 6400 South - Suite 300 
Murray, Utah 84107 
(801)261-6464 
July 25, 1991 
Ms. Jo Carol Nesset-Sale 
Attorney at Law 
Haley and Stolebarger 
Tenth Floor Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1956 
RE: Kendall Nbrthem, USP # 15009 
Dear Jo Carol, 
In response to your inquiry of July 10, 1991, please find enclosed with 
this letter a copy of your client's Waiver of Personal Appearance and a copy 
of the Disposition Form relative to his restitution. 
In your letter you expressed concern that it appeared to you the issue of 
your client's "restitution had been delayed until Kendall's parole date was 
imminent (permitting no choice but to sign or jeopardize his parole date).1' 
That really was not the case at all. As is commonly done with inmates whose 
parole dates are approaching, a hearing had been set for Monday, July 15, 
1991, for the purpose of determining the amount of Mr. Northern's 
restitution. Prior to the hearing, a tentative formula and restitution amount 
had been worked out for discussion at the hearing. In keeping with usual 
practice, that information was made available to the inmate - in this case, 
your client - for prior review so the administrative burden of holding the 
hearing could be avoided if the inmate had no dispute with the tentative 
figure. Mr. Northern was presented with the figure, he expressed no 
disagreement, and he then voluntarily waived his right to have a hearing on 
the matter. Had Mr. Northern opted to have the hearing instead, that decision 
would have in no way delayed his scheduled release on parole, even if the 
hearing had for some reason extended beyond his parole date. Mr. Northern 
appeared to understand that his parole date would not be jeopardized by his 
refusal to sign the waiver and to proceed with a restitution hearing instead 
(the hearing already being firmly scheduled on a date prior to his scheduled 
parole release) but signed the enclosed waiver, thus avoiding a formal hearing* 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
H.L. (Pete) Haun 
Chairman 
Donald E. Blanchard 
Michael R. Sibbett 
William L. Peters 
Heather N. Cooke 
Members 
Letter to Jo Carol Nesset-Sale 
July 22, 1991, 
Page Two 
The restitution amount to which your client agreed was computed as 
follows: 
(1) Lost Income Compensation: 
Prior to his death, the victim, Mr. Hamby, earned approximately $12,000 
yearly driving a taxi cab. Using the workman's compensation approach which 
awards two-thirds of the deceased spouse's gross income to the surviving 
spouse, Mrs. Hamby should be entitled to $8,000 per year of lost income from 
the time of her husband's death until the time she remarried, ten years 
later. Thus, restitution for lost income compensation equals $80,000. 
(2) Child Care Compensation: 
Applying the standard figure of $2,600 per year per child for 
professional child care, the cost to Mrs. Hamby of child care for each of her 
seven children until each reached the age of thirteen would amount to 
$145,600, as illustrated below: 
Child's age at 
father's death: 6 mo's 18 mo's 4 vrs 5 vrs 6 vrs 8 vrs 9 vrs 
Years remaining 
before age 13: 12 yrs 11 vrs 9 vrs 8 vrs 7 vrs 5 vrs 4 vrs 
Annual cost of 
child care: 2.600 2.600 2.600 2.600 2.600 2.600 2.600 
Total per child: 31,200 28,600 23,400 20,800 18,200 13,000 10,400 
Sum of seven figures above = $145,600 
It might conservatively be assumed, however, that once the oldest two 
children reached the age of thirteen, they would be able to accept babysitting 
responsibilities for their younger siblings. Therefore the restitution amount 
expected for child care compensation is limited to the cost of child care for 
the two oldest children until each is thirteen, $13,000 + $10,400 = $23,400. 
(3) Funeral Expenses: 
The actual figure submitted to the Board of Pardons was $2,000. 
(4) Degree of Mr. Northern's Responsibility: 
$80,000 lost income compensation, plus $23,400 child care compensation, 
plus $2,000 funeral expenses equals $105,400. It was the decision of the 
Board that Mr. Northern should be held responsible for twenty-five percent of 
that total loss amount, thus yielding the final restitution figure of $26,350. 
If you have any other questions, feel free to contact me. 
Sincerely yours, 
PAUL LARSEN 
Senior Hearing Officer 
ADDENDUM C 
Board of Pardons Decision Dated July 8, 1988 
Members 
PAULW.BOYDEN 
VICTORIA J. PALACIOS 
GARY L WEBSTER 
THE STATE OF UTAH PAUL W.SHEFFIELD. 
Administrator BOARD OF PARDONS 
6065 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
v A n r\ M i- OBSCBNo. 
Consideration of the Status of ^ n a a i l q . Northern
 > Utah State Prison No. ii miwo9 
The above-entitled matter came on for a hearing before the Utah State Board of Pardons on the _ day of. 
198 "for consideration as: Sth Julv 
5. R^PE 
6. f j RES 
1. • ORIGINAL HEARING 
2 U REHEARING 
3. n REDETERMINATION 
4. • TERMINATION OF SENTENCE AND PAROLE 
After the statement of / * £ / y # g . l / A'Or-TA-Pro 
1) 2L 
and good cause appearing, the Board made the following decision:. 
SPECIAL ATTENTION OF THE BOARD 
ESCISSION 
. and the following witness(es) 
w^-
SJ Rescind 
• Parole to become effective. 
T-/D _, 19 u^> parole date, 
, 19 , with the following special conditions: 
• Amend parole agreement to add the following special conditions: 
2. 
3. 
4. 
*M Rehearing for M<^ 
^CACi-fm Afpr°pri */fc 
, 19_2£2»fo/the following reasons: fiis:kf m 
• Termination of sentence and parole to become effective _ 
• Expiration of sentence 
REMARKS: ? f t r ^ faSr) XKfn^ 
.,19-
.,19 
fff- jryo-tffl. 
Qrd-fr A-il<?mM- r^fO^h 
Crime Sentence Case No. Judge ExpinDate 
Criminal Homicide 
.Aggravated Kobbery 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
JL-life GRSQ=264 Baldwin 
-i-Life CR8Q-264 Baldwin -fcifer 
K is further ordered that in the event the above named shall be found guilty of any infraction of rules and regulations of the Utah State 
Prison, any community corrections center or other residential facility, or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned or is found 
in violation of any other law of the State of Utah prior to the effective date of this decision, the order may be made null and void. 
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date J u l y 8 j 1 & affixed my 
signature as Administrator for and on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons. 
03aM 
Paul 
An application for redetermination may b 
previous action. Applications may be ot Northern v Barnes e t . a l . 
900901905 HC 
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